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OUTDATED AND INEFFECTIVE: AN ANALYSIS OF
MICHIGAN'S GESTATIONAL SURROGACY LAW
AND THE NEED FOR VALIDATION OF
SURROGATE PREGNANCY CONTRACTS
"Simply having children does not make mothers."'
INTRODUCTION
On July 28, 2009, Laschell Baker gave birth to twins, Ethan and
Bridget. 2 Baker served as a gestational surrogate for Scott and Amy
Kehoe, a couple from Grand Rapids, Michigan, who were unable to
have a child due to infertility.3 After deciding to have a child via sur-
rogate, the Kehoes contacted Baker through a pregnancy website.4
The couple chose to utilize both an egg and sperm donor for the preg-
nancy, so they therefore had no genetic relationship to either Ethan or
Bridget.5 Baker initially relinquished the twins to the Kehoes, but she
soon decided to petition a Michigan court for custody when she
learned that Amy Kehoe was being treated for a mental illness.6
Baker asserted that she was afraid for the children's safety due to
Amy Kehoe's illness and that a psychological screening of the
Kehoes-recommended by many professional societies-may have
prevented her from going through with the pregnancy.7 The court
awarded custody to Baker due to her status as the birth mother and
required the Kehoes to give the twins back to Baker one month after
their birth."
The Kehoes and Baker were all residents of Michigan, and they
were prohibited from executing a valid gestational surrogacy contract
to determine the parentage of the twins under Michigan's current stat-
utory framework. Michigan's Surrogate Parenting Act (SPA) makes
surrogacy contracts void and unenforceable, and imposes strict crimi-
1. John A. Shedd Quotes, THINKExiST.COM, http://thinkexist.com/quotation/simplyhaving.
children does not make mothers/210248 (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).
2. Stephanie Saul, Building a Baby, with Few Ground Rules: Uncertain Laws on Surrogacy






8. Saul, supra note 2.
911
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
nal penalties for entering into certain types of such contracts. 9 As a
result, parties seeking to have a child via surrogate in Michigan have
no legal guarantee that their efforts will result in custody of the
child.10
The SPA is now over twenty years old and "by today's technical
standards is completely outdated."" It does not account for growing
infertility rates and advancements in reproductive technology, which
make having a child via surrogate a viable and attractive option for
infertile couples and individuals. 12 Additionally, the SPA does not
provide oversight, regulation, or intervention of gestational surrogate
pregnancies unless something goes wrong. In Doe v. Attorney Gen-
eral, the Michigan appellate court articulated three specific interests
the SPA seeks to protect; however, the current statutory framework
does not protect the asserted interests in its practical application.' 3
Michigan should amend the SPA to address the growing need for
regulation of gestational surrogate pregnancies. The current patch-
work of surrogacy laws in the United States demonstrates that federal
regulation of these contracts would be ideal;14 however, Michigan's
outright ban of gestational surrogacy contracts, coupled with its strict
penalties, calls for immediate attention. New legislation validating ge-
stational surrogacy contracts should be enacted to establish require-
ments that both the intended parents and surrogate must meet in
order for the contract to be upheld. Such legislation would act as a
statutory safeguard to protect the public interests asserted by Michi-
gan. The current SPA is outdated and ineffective because it does not
9. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.851 (West 2002); see also CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR.
& MAUREEN McBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 163 (2006).
10. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.855. Parents utilizing a surrogate cannot contractually
determine parentage under the SPA because it is "[a]n Act to establish surrogate parentage
contracts as contrary to public policy and void ... and to provide for penalties and remedies." Id.
§ 722.851 (editor's caption) (emphasis added).
11. KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 9, at 163.
12. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Essay, Approaching Surrogate Motherhood: Reconsidering
Difference, 26 VT. L. REV. 407, 409 (2002) ("In the last two decades, gestational surrogacy, which
involves the use of in vitro fertilization (IVF), has become increasingly popular."); Flavia Berys,
Comment, Interpreting a Rent-a-Womb Contract: How California Courts Should Proceed When
Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements Go Sour, 42 CAL. W. L. REv. 321, 322 (2006); see also
Jeremy J. Richey, Comment, A Troublesome Good Idea: An Analysis of the Illinois Gestational
Surrogacy Act, 30 S. ILL. U. L.J. 169, 169 (2005) ("Unfortunately, some couples cannot naturally
give birth to biological children but have healthy sex cells. For these couples, gestational surro-
gacy provides a way for them to raise children that are biologically their own.").
13. MIcH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 722.851; Doe v. Attorney Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1992).
14. See generally Paul G. Arshagouni, Be Fruitful and Multiply, by Other Means, if Necessary:
The Time Has Come to Recognize and Enforce Gestational Surrogacy Agreements, 61 DEPAUL
L. REV. 799 (2012).
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prevent gestational surrogate pregnancies from occurring; it simply
turns a blind eye to their existence. Situations like the one in which
the Kehoes found themselves demonstrate that Michigan is behind the
times. The SPA does not provide any legal protection for individu-
als-including the intended parents and surrogate-who decide to
conceive a child through a surrogate pregnancy.
This Comment argues that the Michigan legislature should amend
the SPA to validate gestational surrogacy contracts when all parties to
the contract have met the requirements set forth by the model statute
proposed by this Comment. Part II begins with a brief overview of
gestational surrogacy.' 5 It then discusses the SPA and the govern-
ment's interest in preventing gestational surrogacy contracts. In addi-
tion, it discusses statutes and case law from Illinois, New Hampshire,
Utah, and California.16 Part III analyzes the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals' reasoning in Doe v. Attorney General regarding Michigan's re-
fusal to uphold gestational surrogacy contracts.17 It then examines the
interests asserted by the Doe court in comparison to the statutes of
Illinois, New Hampshire, and Utah. Part III argues that Michigan
should adopt portions of each of these states' surrogacy laws to create
legislation validating and regulating gestational surrogacy contracts.
Part IV discusses the impact of the proposed legislation on gestational
surrogacy contracts and the parties to these contracts.18 Additionally,
it discusses the impact on family law courts and the attorneys who
would be involved with contracts coming under the proposed
legislation.
II. BACKGROUND
The use of a surrogate to conceive a child has become increasingly
popular with infertility rates on the rise1 9 and the continuing advance-
15. See infra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 29-86 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 87-140 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
19. Infertility is defined as the inability to conceive a child or carry a child to term due to a
disease or "an interruption, cessation, or disorder of body functions, systems, or organs of the
male or female reproductive tract." Infertility, AM. Soc'Y FOR REPROD. MED., http://www.
reproductivefacts.org/topics/detail.aspid=36 (last visited Aug. 22, 2011). Infertility in the
United States is becoming a topic increasingly at the forefront of conversation as approximately
7.3 million women in the United States have an impaired ability to have children and 2.1 million
married women ages 15-44 are considered infertile. Infertility, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/
fastats/fertile.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2011). Advances in reproductive technology have al-
lowed infertile couples, women, and same-sex couples to utilize a surrogate pregnancy as a
means to have a child.
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ment of reproductive technology.20 Despite their sensitive nature and
the volatile situations that can arise through the use of a surrogate,
only seventeen jurisdictions have laws concerning surrogate
pregnancies and accompanying contracts. 21 "The remaining 34 states
have mixed or unclear laws and/or court case rulings on whether sur-
rogacy agreements are allowed." 2 2 This Part examines the surrogacy
law of a number of states and some of the challenges associated with
this area of law.23
A. Defining Surrogate Pregnancies
Surrogate pregnancies are divided into two categories: traditional
and gestational. 2 4 Prior to advances in reproductive technology ena-
bling the use of in vitro fertilization (IVF) to conceive a child, artificial
insemination was the only way to initiate a surrogacy pregnancy.25
Under this approach, a traditional surrogate is artificially inseminated
and conceives using her ovum and either the sperm of the intended
father or that of a sperm donor. The surrogate is therefore both the
child's birth and genetic mother.2 6
In contrast, a gestational surrogate has no genetic relationship to
the child. 27 The gestational surrogate is implanted with an embryo
through IVF that is created from either the sperm and ovum of the
intended parents; the sperm of the intended father and an egg donor;
the egg of the intended mother and a sperm donor; or the egg and
20. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 12, at 409.
21. Surrogacy Laws: State by State, Hum. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/issues/2486.htm
(last visited Aug. 25, 2011); see also Christine Metteer Lorillard, Informed Choices and Uniform
Decisions: Adopting the ABA's Self-Enforcing Administrative Model to Ensure Successful Surro-
gacy Arrangements, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 237, 239 (2010) (describing state legislation).
22. Surrogacy Laws: State by State, supra note 21. "The vast majority of states are silent or
near silent on the issues of whether, when, and how surrogacy agreements are enforceable, void,
or voidable. . . . In many of the states that are 'silent' on surrogacy, bills have been shot back-
and-forth through the legislature but come to naught." Lorillard, supra note 21, at 239 n.20
(alteration in original) (quoting Darra L. Hofman, "Mama's Baby, Daddy's Maybe:" A State-by-
State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 Wm. MITCHELL L. REV.
449, 454 (2009)). "Hofman has also observed that '[o]f those states that do have laws on the
books regarding such agreements, the responses range from relying heavily on the Uniform Par-
entage Act or party intent to outright bans or even criminalization of surrogacy.'" Id. (alteration
in original) (quoting Hofman, supra, at 454).
23. See Hofman, supra note 22, at 454-60.
24. See Lorillard, supra note 21, at 244.
25. Steven H. Snyder & Mary Patricia Byrn, The Use of Prebirth Parentage Orders in Surro-
gacy Proceedings, 39 FAM. L.O. 633, 639 (2005).
26. Id.
27. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 9, at 132. For the purpose of this Comment, "surro-
gate pregnancy" refers to gestational surrogate pregnancies.
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sperm of two donors.28 The ability to utilize a gestational surrogate to
conceive a child has led many states to enact legislation dealing with
the unique legal issues raised by this reproductive arrangement.
B. Michigan Gestational Surrogacy Law
Michigan is one of eleven states that hold surrogacy contracts void
and unenforceable, and one of three states to impose civil or criminal
penalties on those who enter into, or aid in the creation of, a gesta-
tional surrogacy contract for compensation. 29 In Doe v. Attorney Gen-
eral, a 1992 decision upholding the SPA, the Michigan Court of
Appeals articulated a set of interests the legislature was purporting to
protect with the passage of the SPA.30 However, the appellate court
has never revisited whether the interests articulated in Doe are actu-
ally being protected by the SPA, despite numerous advances in repro-
ductive technology and the growing popularity of utilizing a surrogate
to conceive.
1. Michigan's Surrogate Parenting Act
The Michigan legislature passed the SPA in 1988 to address gesta-
tional surrogacy contracts both with and without compensation. The
SPA defines a surrogate parentage contract as "a contract, agreement,
or arrangement in which a female agrees to conceive a child through
natural or artificial insemination, or in which a female agrees to surro-
gate gestation, and to voluntarily relinquish her parental or custodial
rights to the child." 3 1 A person may "not enter into, induce, arrange,
procure, or otherwise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage
contract for compensation." 32 Compensation is defined as "a pay-
ment of money, objects, services, or anything else having monetary
value except payment of expenses incurred as a result of the preg-
nancy and the actual medical expenses of a surrogate mother or surro-
28. Id. at 132-33.
Gestational surrogates are most typically used when the woman of a married couple
has viable eggs but cannot carry a child to term. Such a gestational surrogacy arrange-
ment enables an infertile couple to maintain a genetic connection to the resulting chil-
dren when their own gametes are used to produce an embryo that is transferred to the
womb of the surrogate.
Id. at 133.
29. D.C. CODE § 16-402(b) (2001); MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 722.859 (West 2002); N.Y.
Dom. ReL. LAw § 123(2)(a)-(b) (McKinney 2010); see also Carla Spivak, The Law of Surrogate
Motherhood in the United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 101 (2010).
30. See Doe v. Attorney Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484, 486-87 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
31. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.853(i).
32. Id. § 722.859(1).
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gate carrier."33 The SPA not only codifies that gestational surrogacy
contracts are void and unenforceable, but also imposes criminal penal-
ties on any party entering into such a contract for compensation. 34
A participating party . . . who knowingly enters into a surrogate
parentage contract for compensation is guilty of a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000.00 or imprisonment
for not more than 1 year, or both.35 A person other than a partici-
pating party who induces, arranges, procures, or otherwise assists in
the formation of a surrogate parentage contract for compensation is
guilty of a felony punishable by a fine of not more than $50,000.00
or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 36
The strictness of Michigan's SPA makes it "arguably the most anti-
surrogacy [state] in the United States."37
2. Doe v. Attorney General
The Michigan Court of Appeals has not addressed the SPA for
nineteen years. In Doe, the plaintiffs, a group of infertile couples and
potential surrogates, challenged the SPA on the grounds that it denied
them their state and federal constitutional rights to privacy, due pro-
cess, and equal protection.38 The plaintiffs asserted that the state had
no compelling interest in intervening in conduct related to surrogate
pregnancies. The appellate court disagreed, holding that the legisla-
ture had a compelling interest sufficient to justify intrusion into the
plaintiffs' rights to procreate via surrogacy.39 The appellate court ar-
ticulated three interests justifying its holding.
First, the appellate court reasoned that the government had a com-
pelling interest in preventing children from becoming merchandise, as
surrogacy for profit could encourage treatment of babies as commodi-
ties.40 Second, it found that the SPA furthered the government's com-
pelling interest in protecting the best interests of the child. Because
surrogacy arrangements focus entirely on the parents' desire, parties
to a surrogacy arrangement are apt to be insensitive to the best inter-
33. Id. § 722.853(a).
34. Id. H§ 722.855, .859.
35. Id. § 722.859(1).
36. Id. § 722.859(2)-(3).
37. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 9, at 163. There is no contract protection in Michi-
gan, and intended parents would likely have no judicial recourse if a dispute arose regarding the
pregnancy or custody of the child. Id.
38. Doe v. Attorney Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484, 485 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
39. Id. at 486-87.
40. Id. ("It could be only a matter of time before desirable, healthy babies would come to be
'viewed quantitatively, as merchandise that can be acquired, at market or discount rates."'
(quoting Shari O'Brien, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding Ground for Surrogacy, 65 N.C. L.
REV. 127, 144 (1986))).
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ests of the child.4 1 The appellate court expressed concern that emo-
tional trauma would be inflicted upon the child if one of the parties to
a gestational surrogacy contract "has a change of heart" and a custody
battle ensues. 4 2 Third, the court stated that preventing the exploita-
tion of women is a compelling interest and expressed concern that
women compensated for surrogacy services would be reduced to the
status of "breeding machines" and that such a system would create
gender- and economic-based exploitation.4 3 The appellate court con-
cluded that surrogate pregnancy contracts, no matter how they are
created, logically dictate that there be no connection between the
birth mother and the child and that if such contracts were to be vali-
dated, "every surrogate mother would soon be cast in the role of an
'unfeeling, emotionless machine whose purpose is to create a life and
then disappear.' "4 4
C. Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Law
In contrast to the SPA, Illinois's Gestational Surrogacy Act (GSA)
is arguably the most comprehensive surrogacy legislation. It not only
validates surrogacy contracts, but permits reasonable compensation to
the surrogate. 4 5 The Illinois legislature enacted the GSA in 2005 to
establish consistent standards and procedural safeguards for all parties
to a gestational surrogacy contract and to establish the parentage of
children born under such contracts prior to birth.46
41. Id. at 487. In In re Baby M, quite possibly the most famous surrogacy case, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey held that a traditional surrogacy contract requiring a paid surrogate to
surrender custody of the child to the intended parents was void. 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988).
The court awarded custody to the biological father (the intended mother had no genetic relation-
ship to the child), but also granted visitation rights to the surrogate. Id. The court went on to
state that the long-term effects of surrogacy contracts were unknown but feared. Id. at 1250. It
is also interesting to note that while some states, even Michigan, allow compensation to the
surrogate for medical and other expenses incurred during the pregnancy, New Jersey prohibits
any and all payments to a surrogate. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 9, at 167-68.
42. Doe, 487 N.w.2d at 487.
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting Steven M. Recht, Note, "M" Is for Money: Baby M and the Surrogate Mother-
hood Controversy, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 1013, 1022 (1988)).
45. KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 9, at 157.
46. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/5 (2010).
Section 5 of the GSA contains the act's purposes. There, the Illinois General Assem-
bly communicated a twofold purpose. The purpose's first prong protects the parties to
gestational surrogacy contracts by creating consistent standards and procedural safe-
guards. The second prong confirms the legal status of the children resulting from gesta-
tional surrogacy contracts. Section 5 further communicates that the standards and
safeguards established by the GSA help ensure that gestational surrogacy contracts are
used in such a way that they are consistent with Illinois public policy.
Richey, supra note 12, at 172 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The GSA establishes safeguards for surrogate contracts by setting
forth a number of eligibility requirements that the intended parents
and the surrogate must meet. 4 7 A gestational surrogate must meet six
requirements at the time the gestational surrogacy contract is exe-
cuted. She must (1) be at least twenty-one years old; (2) have previ-
ously given birth; (3) have completed a medical evaluation; (4) have
completed a mental health evaluation; (5) have consulted an indepen-
dent attorney to discuss the terms of the contract and the potential
legal consequences for entering into the contract; and (6) have ob-
tained a health insurance policy that meets certain requirements, but
only if the contract does not require the intended parents to obtain a
policy for her. 4 8 Intended parents, on the other hand, must meet four
requirements at the time the contract is executed: (1) if there is only
one intended parent, that person must provide one of the gametes
used to create the embryo, or if the intended parents are a couple, one
of them must provide a gamete used in the creation of the embryo; (2)
the intended parents must demonstrate a medical need for the use of a
gestational surrogate supported by an affidavit from a qualified medi-
cal professional; (3) the intended parents must undergo a mental
health evaluation; and (4) they must consult an independent attorney
to discuss the terms and potential legal consequences of the contract. 4 9
In addition to creating eligibility requirements for the surrogate and
intended parents, the GSA also sets forth requirements for the con-
tract itself.50 A gestational surrogacy contract must be in writing, wit-
nessed by two competent adults, and executed prior to any medical
procedures (other than the required medical and mental health evalu-
ations). The signed contract must additionally contain a written ac-
knowledgement stating that the gestational surrogate and the
intended parents received information about their legal, financial, and
contractual rights and the expectations, penalties, and obligations of
the contract. Finally, if the contract provides for compensation, it
must be placed in escrow before the commencement of any medical
procedure.51
The GSA's parentage determinations apply only when the surro-
gate and intended parents satisfy all requirements. 5 2 The intended
47. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20.
48. Id. § 47/20(a)(1)-(6).
49. Id. § 47/20(b).
50. See id. § 47/25(a).
51. Id. § 47/25(b).
52. See id. § 47/15(b). The GSA also includes a provision that the intended parents still have a
duty to support any child resulting from the pregnancy even if they breach the surrogacy con-
tract. Id. § 47/30(a)-(b).
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parent is deemed the child's legal parent for the purposes of state law
immediately upon the birth of the child, and the child is considered
the legitimate child of the intended parent.53 Neither the gestational
surrogate nor her husband is considered the parent of the child.54 The
GSA provides for the establishment of parentage before the child's
birth upon certification of the request for prebirth parentage from the
state department of public health.55 By creating this procedure, the
GSA eliminates the need for court supervision or intervention.56
D. New Hampshire Surrogacy Law
In New Hampshire, both the surrogate and the intended parents
must meet certain eligibility requirements for judicial approval of a
gestational surrogacy contract before implantation of any embryos.57
All parties to a gestational surrogacy contract must be at least twenty-
one years old.58 The surrogate must be medically acceptable, which
requires that she be in good health and have had at least one preg-
nancy that resulted in a viable delivery. 59 The intended mother must
be infertile, and one of the intended parents must provide a gamete
used to create the embryo that will be implanted into the surrogate.60
Additionally, the egg must be from either the intended mother or the
surrogate,6 1 precluding the possibility of using an egg donor, even if
the intended father's sperm is used.
New Hampshire also established requirements for the contract itself
in order to achieve judicial pre-approval. 62 The contract must be
signed by the intended parent, surrogate, and surrogate's husband (if
53. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/15(b) ("[P]arental rights shall vest in the intended parent or par-
ents immediately upon the birth of the child [and] sole custody of the child shall rest with the
intended parent or parents.").
54. Id. § 47/15(b)(6).
55. Id. § 47/25(b)(2) ("[A gestational surrogacy contract] shall be executed prior to the com-
mencement of any medical procedures...."); see also KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 9, at
157. "The required certifications must be on Illinois Department of Public Health forms and
must be filed in a manner consistent with the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984." Richey, supra note
12, at 175.
56. KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 9, at 157. The GSA also provides for situations in
which the gestational surrogate is implanted with the wrong embryo; namely, when the intended
parents have no genetic relationship to the resulting child. In this event, the intended parents
are still considered the legal parents of the child under Illinois law "unless otherwise determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction." Richey, supra note 12, at 174 (quoting 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 47/15(c)).
57. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:25 (1955 & repl. vol. 2002).
58. Id. § 168-B:17(I).
59. Id. § 168-B:17(V).
60. Id. § 168-B:17(II), (III).
61. Id. § 168-B:17(IV).
62. See id. § 168-B:16(I).
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she is married) and must include the following provisions: (1) the con-
sent of the surrogate and husband (if she is married), stating that they
will either surrender custody of the child or accept the responsibilities
of parenthood if the surrogate gives adequate notice of an intent to
keep the child; (2) the consent of the intended parents that they will
accept the responsibilities of custody of the child, unless the surrogate
gives adequate notice of her intent to keep the child; (3) the surro-
gate's right to keep the child if she meets the notice requirements out-
lined below; and (4) if the surrogate will receive a fee, a provision that
the fee be limited only to pregnancy-related medical expenses, lost
wages related to the pregnancy, insurance, reasonable attorney fees
and court costs, and costs related to nonmedical expenses such as
mental health evaluations and home studies.63 New Hampshire allows
a surrogate to keep the child if at any time within seventy-two hours
after giving birth she executes a signed writing indicating her intent to
keep the child and delivers the writing either to the intended parents,
attending physician, or hospital medical director. 64 This right may be
exercised only by the surrogate herself, not by a guardian or represen-
tative of the surrogate. 65
E. Utah Surrogacy Law
Utah's stance on gestational surrogacy contracts is of particular in-
terest because prior to the state's enactment of the Uniform Parent-
age Act (UPA), Utah prohibited gestational surrogacy contracts. 66
However, in 2005 the Utah legislature changed its position 180 de-
grees when it enacted the UPA, which validates these contracts.67
Utah's version of the UPA establishes requirements that the in-
tended parents and surrogate must meet in order for a gestational sur-
rogacy contract to be upheld.68 Utah is the only state other than
Illinois that allows the intended parents to reasonably compensate a
surrogate for her services. 69 All parties to a surrogacy contract must
be at least twenty-one years old and have gone through sufficient
mental health counseling, evidenced by a signed certificate from a
mental health professional. 70 The surrogate must have had at least
one other pregnancy and successful delivery, and the pregnancy must
63. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:25.
64. Id. § 168-B:25(IV).
65. Id.
66. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 9, at 175 & n.198.
67. Id.
68. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-802 to -803 (LexisNexis 1953 & repl. vol. 2008).
69. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/25(b)(4) (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803(h).
70. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803(d), (i).
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not create an undue risk to the life of the unborn child or the physical
or mental health of the surrogate.71 Additionally, an egg of the surro-
gate may not be used to create the embryo, and if the surrogate is
married, her husband's sperm likewise may also not be used. 72 The
intended parents must demonstrate through medical evidence that the
intended mother is unable to conceive or carry a child to term without
risk to her physical or mental health.73 Utah's UPA also requires the
intended parents to undergo a home study to determine if they meet
the standards of fitness applicable to adoptive parents, unless a tribu-
nal waives this requirement. 74 Finally, Utah's UPA does not permit a
contract for the birth of a child in which neither of the intended par-
ents is the donor of genetic material. 75
Under Utah's UPA, if the gestational surrogacy contract meets the
requirements established under the UPA, the intended parents may
petition a tribunal to validate their contract, and this tribunal then has
the authority to declare the intended parents the legal parents of the
child.76 However, before a petition to validate the contract can be
brought in front of a tribunal, Utah requires that either the intended
parents or surrogate reside within Utah for ninety days.77
F. California Surrogacy Case Law
California has more surrogacy cases than any other state in the
country; however, it does not have a statute directly dealing with sur-
rogate pregnancies or contracts.78 California courts have referred to
the general provisions of the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act (1973
UPA), 79 and they have used it to determine a number of contested
71. Id. § 78B-15-803(f).
72. Id. § 78B-15-801(7), (8).
73. Id. § 78B-15-803(2)(b).
74. Id. § 78B-15-803(2)(c).
75. Id. § 78B-15-801(5).
76. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-802 to -803.
77. Id.
78. KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 9, at 149, 152. "California is illustrative of jurisdic-
tions that have no statutory provisions governing surrogacy but expressly allow prebirth parent-
age determinations." Snyder & Byrn, supra note 25, at 643.
79. UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr (1973).
When work on this Act began, the notion of substantive legal equality of children
regardless of the marital status of their parents seemed revolutionary if one considered
existing state law on this subject. Even though the Conference had put itself on record
in favor of equal rights of support and inheritance in the Paternity Act and the Probate
Code, the law of many states continued to differentiate very significantly in the legal
treatment of legitimate and illegitimate children.
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surrogacy cases.80 California was the first state to look at the parties'
intention, rather than biology or gestation, to determine parentage in
contested surrogacy cases.8 '
In Johnson v. Calvert, a gestational surrogate threatened to seek
custody of an unborn child genetically related to the intended par-
ents.82 The intended parents subsequently sought a prebirth parent-
age determination declaring them the legal parents of the unborn
child.83 The California Supreme Court noted that, under the 1973
UPA, both genetics and gestation were sufficient to establish parent-
age, but that a child could not have two legal mothers. 84 The court
then looked to the original intent of the parties-that the intended
parents would be the legal parents of the child-to determine
parentage in favor of the intended parents.85 "The Johnson decision
stands for the proposition 'that under California law, when genetic
consanguinity and giving birth do not coincide in one woman, 'she
who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to
raise as her own is the natural mother."' 86
This Act is promulgated at a time when the states need new legislation on this subject
because the bulk of current law on the subject of children born out of wedlock is either
unconstitutional or subject to grave constitutional doubt.
Id. (citation omitted).
80. Snyder & Byrn, supra note 25, at 643-44.
81. KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 9, at 149. Advocates of the intentionalist view argue
that the intention of the intended parents regarding the pregnancy should be legitimized, and
therefore, the intended parents should be declared the legal parents of the child. Stephanie F.
Schultz, Comment, Surrogacy Arrangements: Who Are the "Parents" of a Child Born Through
Artificial Reproductive Techniques?, 22 OHio N.U. L. REV. 273, 282 (1995). In entering into a
surrogacy arrangement, the intended parents expend a vast amount of time, energy, and money,
and the intentionalists argue that the intended parents should be given custody of their child due
to their deliberate choice to bring about the birth of the child. Id. "It seems logical that since
parenthood is such an important and long-term commitment, it would be preferable for individu-
als to be more purposeful about their procreative intentions." Id.




86. KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 9, at 149-50 (quoting Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th
84, 93 (1993)). California courts also dealt with the intent rule when examining child support
responsibility of a divorced couple that conceived a child through a surrogate pregnancy. See
Buzzanca v. Buzzanca (In re Marriage of Buzzanca), 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1998)
("In each instance, a child is procreated because a medical procedure was initiated and con-
sented to by intended parents."). The appellate court held that the father (who had no genetic
relationship to the child) was responsible for support payments because he had initially intended
to raise the child as its legal father. Id. at 293-94; see also Jaycee B. v. Superior Court of Orange
Cnty., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 694, 702 (Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the intended father, who was not
genetically related to the child born through a gestational surrogate pregnancy, was nonetheless
responsible for child support because but for the acted upon intentions of the intended parents,




In Doe v. Attorney General, the Michigan Court of Appeals cited
the compelling need to protect both the children and women of surro-
gate pregnancies as the policy supporting the SPA. 8 7 Upon first
glance, this policy seems sufficiently compelling to warrant govern-
mental intrusion into a sphere generally treated with the utmost pri-
vacy; however, the reasoning behind that policy and its practical
application fall short of the asserted objective. The fallibility of the
SPA is best seen by comparing the interests stated in Doe to the much
more comprehensive legislation and case law of states that validate
gestational surrogacy contracts.
The Michigan legislature should amend the SPA to uphold gesta-
tional surrogacy contracts by following the structure utilized by states
such as Illinois, New Hampshire, Utah, and California to form its new
legislation. By amending the SPA, Michigan can impose requirements
that must be met by the intended parents and surrogate in order for a
contract to be valid. These measures will ensure that the intended
parents and surrogate are not only willing, but also capable of enter-
ing into such an arrangement.
A. Analysis of Doe v. Attorney General
1. Preventing Children from Becoming Commodities
The SPA provides some of the strictest penalties of any surrogacy
legislation in the United States regarding surrogacy contracts for com-
pensation." The Doe court articulated the legislature's fear that chil-
dren would become commodities as a basis for upholding the SPA.
The court stated that whatever idealism motivates a woman to be-
come a surrogate is run "asunder" by the introduction of profit into
such arrangements. 89 However, in spite of the Doe court's concern,
the dreaded baby-selling market does not exist in states that permit
compensation to surrogates.
87. The first interest asserted by the court was preventing children from becoming commodi-
ties, the second was the protection of the best interests of the child, and third was the interest in
the prevention of the exploitation of women. Doe v. Attorney Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484, 486-87
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
88. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.859(2)-(3) (West 2002). A participating party is defined as
"a biological mother, biological father, surrogate carrier, or the spouse of a biological mother,
biological father, or surrogate carrier." Id. § 722.853(e).
89. Doe, 487 N.W.2d at 486. "It could be only a matter of time before desirable, healthy
babies would come to be 'viewed quantitatively, as merchandise that can be acquired, at market
or discount rates."' Id. at 486-87 (quoting O'Brien, supra note 40, at 144).
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In determining that permitting compensation to a surrogate would
naturally lead to the creation of a baby-selling market, the Doe court
assumed that the birth of a child using a gestational surrogate is much
easier than it actually is in practice.90 According to the Society for
Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART), there were approxi-
mately 141,000 attempts at conceiving a child through IVF in 2008,
and only 801 attempts were made using a surrogate. 91 Of those 801
attempts, approximately 290 resulted in the live birth of a child. 92 The
small number of children born each year through surrogate
pregnancies suggests that the creation of a thriving baby-selling mar-
ket through compensation is not a realistic outcome.
Michigan's outright ban on any surrogacy contracts, in fact, does not
protect against the possibility of a baby-selling market. Instead, it cre-
ates an environment with no oversight or regulation of transactions
between surrogates and intended parents. By enforcing surrogacy
contracts, the Michigan legislature would be able to regulate the time
before, during, and after a gestational surrogate pregnancy takes
place, just as the GSA has given Illinois a greater ability to regulate
these pregnancies.93
The GSA provides an extensive list of requirements that the parties
and the contract must meet before any action to create the pregnancy
takes place.94 These requirements create safeguards that serve to pro-
tect all parties involved. 95 The SPA provides no such protection, sim-
ply holding such contracts unenforceable and implementing criminal
penalties for contracts providing for compensation.
When the low birthrate from surrogate pregnancies is examined in
conjunction with the demanding and comprehensive requirements
90. See id.
91. See Clinical Summary Report, SART, https://www.sartcorsonline.com/rptCSRPublicMult
Year.aspx?ClinicPKID=0 (last visited Sept. 8, 2011). SART is the primary organization of pro-
fessionals in the practice of assisted reproductive technology, and represents over eighty-five
percent of the assisted reproductive technologies clinics in the United States. What Is SART?,
SART, http://www.sart.org/detail.aspx?id=1864 (last visited Sept. 8, 2011).
92. IVF Success Rate Reports, SART National Summary 2008, SART, https://www.sartcorson
line.com/rptCSRPublicMultYear.aspx?ClinicPKID=0 (last visited Feb. 25, 2011) [hereinafter
IVF Success Rate Reports].
93. Lori B. Andrews, Commentary, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for
Surrogate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343, 2368-69 (1995) ("Enforcing contracts can help
demonstrate that children are not fungible commodities, but unique individuals. .. . '[The more
every child is unique, the more . . . children are neither fungible nor reducible to specific traits,
the stronger the claim for specific performance upon breach of any such agreement."' (quoting
Marjorie M. Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for
Gender-Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 297, 364)).
94. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2010).
95. Id. § 47/5.
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provided for under the GSA, the creation of a baby-selling market in
Illinois seems nearly impossible. The concerns expressed in Doe
should be given serious consideration, but utilizing an outright ban of
surrogacy contracts to deal with those concerns has been ineffectual.
Michigan's ban prevents any regulation of these activities, which cre-
ates a greater potential for a baby-selling market than in Illinois where
reasonable compensation of a surrogate is permitted.
2. Protecting the Best Interests of the Child
The Doe court articulated two concerns regarding the best interests
of children: (1) surrogacy agreements focus solely on the desires and
interests of the parents96 and (2) the damage to children due to the
custody battles that would occur if one of the parties to a surrogacy
contract had a change of heart. 97 The court's first concern deals with
the competing bonds between the child and her biological mother ver-
sus the bond between the child and her intended mother, as well as
the potential harm to the child when she learns of her manner of
birth.98 The court stated that surrogacy contracts naturally focus
solely on the interests of the parties involved, but did not further artic-
ulate how this concern is actually manifested. 99 By utilizing the best
interests of the child standard, the court seemed to express concern
regarding the effect on a child of being parented by someone other
than the biological mother. It is well established that infants who are
unable to form a bond with an adult during early childhood are less
likely to have the ability to form enduring relationships later in life.100
While this suggests the importance of a child developing a bond to at
96. Doe v. Attorney Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) ("[Tjhe parties are apt
to be insensitive to what would be in the children's best interests. That position is in direct
opposition to the child custody law in this state.").
97. Id. (stating that a change of heart by one of the parties would no doubt "inflict grievous
wounds upon the child regardless of who prevails").
98. John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the
Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 400-01 (1991) ("In general, it is argued that
separating the child from the birth mother may affect the child adversely in two ways. First, the
child may incur irrevocable psychological harm because the parent and the child fail to develop
an emotional "bond." . . . Second, the child may experience psychological harm due to uncer-
tainty regarding its biological heritage." (footnote omitted)).
99. Doe, 487 N.W.2d at 487.
100. Hill, supra note 98, at 401-02. "One study found a strong correlation between insecurely
attached infants and those who experience a higher level of nonmaternal care in the first year of
life." Id. at 402. Other studies indicate that the attachment of a child to an adult figure in
infancy may have an affect on the IQ of that child. Id. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, re-
searchers began to observe what appeared to be an increase in the cases of child abuse suffered
by children born prematurely. Id. at 401. Therein developed a body of evidence suggesting that
there must be a bond developed between the parents and the "child during a critical period early
in infancy-according to some, within twelve hours of birth." Id.
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least one parent, no evidence supports the contention that the attach-
ment must be formed with the biological parent. 01 The legislature
expressed concern regarding children born to surrogate pregnancies,
but enacted legislation that, in actuality, does not protect that interest.
Banning surrogacy contracts does not prevent surrogate pregnancies
from taking place, as evidenced by situations such as the Kehoes'; it
only prevents those pregnancies from being regulated. In fact, some
Michigan medical groups provide and advertise gestational surrogate
services 102 despite the fact that no contract can be entered into by the
parties legally determining the parentage of the child.
Illinois, New Hampshire, and Utah have legislation that better en-
sures that children born to surrogate pregnancies will be placed with
an adult ready and able to care for the child during critical stages of
infancy. 103 Under the Illinois GSA, the parentage of the child is es-
tablished prebirth, allowing the child to begin bonding with the in-
tended parents immediately upon its birth.104 New Hampshire and
Utah go even further by requiring judicial approval of a surrogate
parenting contract before the surrogate can be impregnated with the
embryo. 105 These regulations protect the best interests of child far
better than the SPA because the legislatures are able to enact safe-
guards, such as mental health evaluations, reviews by independent
counsel, and judicial oversight. These safeguards protect the well-
being of children by allowing them to bond immediately with the in-
tended parents and ensuring that the intended parents are fit.
The Doe court also stated a concern that the psychological well-
being of children born to surrogate pregnancies, especially those for
compensation, would be irreparably harmed if they learned of the cir-
cumstances of their birth. 0 6 However, as one commenter has sug-
gested, how can one make the argument that children born to
surrogacy agreements, even those for compensation, would be better
off not being born at all?' 0 7 As surrogate Jan Sutton stated, "The
child born of this process is not 'bought,' 'rejected,' 'abandoned,' or
'sold,' but it is 'planned,' 'desired,' 'loved,' 'given,' and 'nurtured' by
101. Id. at 403. "What is important is the psychology, not the biology, of the relationship." Id.
102. Female Gestational Carrier, REPROD. MED. ASSOCIATES MICH., http://www.rmami.com/
treatments-female-gestational-carrier-troy-michigan.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).
103. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47 (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16 (1955 & repl. vol.
2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801 (LexisNexis 1953 & repl. vol. 2008).
104. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/35(a).
105. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16(I); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803.
106. See Doe v. Attorney Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); see also Hill,
supra note 98, at 403 ("It is argued that ... a child will be disadvantaged by the 'unnatural'
procreative process that brought her into the world.").
107. Andrews, supra note 93, at 2358.
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the adults involved."108 The real danger to the best interests of the
child does not stem from the child learning that she was a product of a
surrogacy agreement or even that her parents compensated the surro-
gate for her services, but from the uncertainty put into place by Michi-
gan's outright ban on surrogate pregnancy agreements and the
accompanying criminal penalties for contracts including
compensation. 109
The Doe court asserted that the custody battles that would inevita-
bly follow when a party to a surrogacy agreement changed her mind
would cause further psychological harm to the child.110 However, the
court assumed that custody battles would only arise in the context of
surrogacy contracts, an assumption dispelled by the situation in which
the Kehoes found themselves. Surrogacy contracts like those en-
forced in Illinois, New Hampshire, and Utah establish parentage
before the child is even born. This prebirth parentage determination
serves to prevent custody battles, especially in states that require judi-
cial approval for surrogacy contracts, by legally establishing the par-
ents of the child before a pregnancy even takes place.
3. Preventing the Exploitation of Women
The Michigan Court of Appeals stated that protecting women from
both gender- and economic-based exploitation is a compelling reason
for the legislature to enact the SPA."'1 The court assumed that if sur-
rogate pregnancy contracts were upheld, "every surrogate mother
108. Id. Another surrogate interviewed by Andrews stated:
I don't see how the children could possibly feel anything negative.. . . These children
will feel special. . . . No one accidentally got pregnant. No one just had sex with their
boyfriend or had fifteen kids and another one came along who they had to place for
adoption. There were two couples carefully considering whether or not to bring a child
into the world.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting LORI ANDREWS, BETWEEN STRANGERS: SURROGATE
MOTHERS, EXPECTANT FATHERS, & BRAVE NEW BABIES 275 (1989)). For further discussion of
this point, see LORI B. ANDREWS, NEW CONCEPrIONs: A CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO THE NEWEST
INFERTILITY TREATMENTS, INCLUDING IN VITRo FERTILIZATION, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION,
AND SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (1984); Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Chal-
lenge for Feminists, 16 LAW. MED. & HEALTH CARE 72 (1988).
109. See Andrews, supra note 93, at 2358 ("[C]hildren [can] be stigmatized as the product of a
criminal act and (in the case of contract nonenforcement) can lead to the child being subjected
to years of litigation to determine who will be considered his or her legal parents.").
110. Doe, 487 N.W.2d at 487 ("The long-term effects are by no means limited to the emotional
trauma that might result from knowing of the purchase and sale aspect of one's birth. The cus-
tody battles that in all likelihood will occur where one of the parties to a surrogacy contract has a
change of heart, no doubt, will inflict grievous wounds upon the child regardless of who
prevails.").
111. Id. ("Surrogacy-for-profit arrangements have the potential for demeaning women by re-
ducing them to the status of 'breeding machines."').
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would soon be cast in the role of an 'unfeeling, emotionless machine
whose purpose is to create a life and then disappear."'ll 2 This reason-
ing doubts a woman's individual ability to decide what is right for her
and for her life. The court feared that surrogacy contracts for com-
pensation would inevitably place economically disadvantaged women
in the position of "breeding machines" for affluent couples.113 It ap-
pears that the reality is very different. While compensation may be a
motive for some women to become surrogates, most are motivated by
other reasons.1 1 4 Studies suggest that women who become surrogates
do so for reasons such as wanting to help an infertile couple because
their own life had been touched by infertility, wanting to give couples
the chance to be parents, and receiving the benefits-such as personal
satisfaction garnered from helping a couple to have a child-of being
a surrogate.'1 5
The Doe court further reasoned that it is the surrogate who bears
any burden under a surrogacy contract, as it is her life that is put in
danger and it is her conduct that is restricted.1 6 Under Michigan law,
this can be the case. Uncompensated surrogate pregnancies are not
criminalized pursuant to the SPA, but the legislature and courts have
no ability to require participation from the intended parents.117 In
contrast, in states such as Illinois, New Hampshire, and Utah, the in-
tended parents are required to undergo mental health evaluations,
and Illinois also requires the intended parents to obtain independent
112. Id. (quoting Recht, supra note 44, at 1022).
113. Id.
114. Andrews, supra note 93, at 2353; Richey, supra note 12, at 190; see also Lori B. Andrews
& Lisa Douglass, Comment, Alternative Reproduction, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 623, 674 (1991) ("Re-
cent psychological studies of surrogates show the following reasons for these women's decisions
to participate. Some said they were impressed by the plight of infertile friends or relatives.
Others said they enjoyed pregnancy, but did not want to raise another child themselves. They
enjoyed parenting and wanted to help others who were unable to have children to become par-
ents. A few surrogates said the prospect of payment was attractive, but none of the women in
Hanafin's study said that money was the deciding factor for their participation.").
115. A study of 34 surrogates by the City University in London found that 31 (91%) stated
they were motivated in part by "wanting to help a childless couple," 5 (15%) were motivated by
the "enjoyment of pregnancy," 2 (6%) motivated by "self-fulfillment," and only 1 (3%) stated
that compensation "was a motivating factor." Vasanti Jadva et al., Surrogacy: The Experiences of
Surrogate Mothers, 18 Hum. REPROD. 2196, 2199 (2003).
116. Doe, 487 N.W.2d at 487 ("The contracting couple, on the other hand, need to supply only
the sperm and the compensation. While the surrogate endures the nine-month gestation period
and all the attendant physical burdens and risks, the contracting couple are free to go about their
lives, anticipating the delivery of their baby.").
117. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.851 (West 2002).
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counsel."" Utah goes a step further by requiring a home visit for the
intended parents before a court will approve the contract.119
B. Proposed Model Michigan Surrogacy Law
Michigan should enact new legislation validating gestational surro-
gacy contracts and addressing several different areas that warrant reg-
ulation. First, and most importantly, the statute must establish
comprehensive requirements for the intended parents and surrogate
to ensure that all parties are willing and capable of entering into the
agreement. The statute should also address the format of the contract
and directions for a prebirth determination of parentage. The statute
should additionally address the role of the judiciary, as well the availa-
bility of compensation for the surrogate and any residency require-
ments of the parties. Finally, the legislature should address how
disputes regarding these surrogacy contracts would be resolved.
1. Requirements for Surrogates
The Michigan legislature should enact new legislation enforcing sur-
rogacy contracts and, in doing so, create requirements to ensure that
surrogates enter into contracts freely and voluntarily and are physi-
cally and mentally able to carry the baby. Illinois's GSA provides
comprehensive requirements to ensure the protection of surrogates,
and the Michigan legislature should find it highly instructive. Similar
to Illinois, the Michigan legislature should require the surrogate to (1)
be at least twenty-one years old, (2) have given birth to at least one
child, (3) have completed a medical evaluation, (4) have completed a
mental health evaluation, and (5) have received a consultation with
independent legal counsel laying out the obligations under the con-
tract.120 Additionally, the legislature should require that the egg and
sperm used to create the embryo not be from either the surrogate or
her husband, thereby ensuring they have no genetic claim to the
child. 121 By enacting mandatory requirements such as these, the
Michigan legislature would provide the power to regulate these con-
tracts not only to courts, but also to mental health professionals and
the surrogate's own independent counsel, creating an assembly line of
118. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20(b)(3)-(4) (2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:18 to -B:19
(1955 & repl. vol. 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803(2)(d) (LexisNexis 1953 & repl. vol.
2008).
119. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803(2)(c).
120. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20(a)(1)-(5).
121. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801(7) to -801(8).
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sorts to protect her interests and ensure she is capable of acting as a
surrogate.
2. Requirements for Intended Parents
The Michigan legislature should also enact mandatory requirements
for intended parents to ensure they are capable of caring for the re-
sulting child.122 Following the lead of the Illinois, New Hampshire,
and Utah legislatures, Michigan should require intended parents to
undergo a medical evaluation to confirm there is a medical need for a
surrogate pregnancy. A medical evaluation will help to prevent a
baby-selling market from forming by ensuring the intended parents
actually have some medical need to engage in the use of a surrogate.
Like the surrogate, the intended parents should also be at least
twenty-one years old and required to submit to a mental health evalu-
ation.123 However, unlike those states, the Michigan legislature
should not require that the egg or sperm used to create the embryo be
from either of the intended parents. This requirement would prevent
couples like the Kehoes from obtaining protection under the surro-
gacy legislation because they were not genetically related to either of
the twins. However, by enforcing contracts such as the Kehoes' while
simultaneously requiring that neither the egg nor the sperm be pro-
vided by the surrogate or her husband, the statute would create a
greater possibility of dispute regarding parentage because neither
party could show a genetic relationship to the child. Therefore, the
proposed statute must also require that a court establish parentage
prior to birth. By doing so, the Michigan legislature would give power
to the courts to regulate this unique type of contract.
3. Requirements for the Contract
Like New Hampshire's statute, Michigan should require that the
contract be signed by the intended parents, the surrogate, and the sur-
rogate's husband (if she is married). 124 By signing the contract, the
intended parents would consent to all responsibilities of parenting the
child, while the surrogate and her husband would consent to give up
all claims to the child and relinquish custody immediately upon
birth.125 Additionally, the contract should include signed certificates
from medical and mental health professionals stating that the in-
122. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20(b)(2)-(3); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:16(I)(a), B:17(II);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803(2)(b), (d).
123. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801(6).




tended parents and the surrogate underwent the required medical and
mental health evaluations. 126 A written acknowledgement from the
intended parents and surrogate that each retained independent coun-
sel and were made aware of all obligations and penalties under the
contract should also be included. 127 Most importantly, the contract
should include a clause stating that custody vests with the intended
parents immediately upon the birth of the child and need not be judi-
cially approved after the birth. 128
4. Prebirth Judicial Approval
The procedures set forth under the Illinois GSA eliminate the need
for judicial approval of the surrogacy contract,129 thereby eliminating
the cost of court and attorney fees that come with judicial approval
and often leading to a shorter wait before the pregnancy can occur.
However, due to Michigan's current refusal to enforce surrogacy con-
tracts, requiring judicial pre-approval is the most appropriate path. In
requiring judicial pre-approval, the Michigan legislation should follow
Utah's model.130 In Utah, the intended parents may petition a tribu-
nal to validate the gestational surrogacy contract and establish the le-
gal parents of the child.131 The new legislation should state that once
the requirements for both the intended parents and surrogate have
been met, the court shall issue an order validating the contract and
establishing the intended parents as the legal parents of the child upon
its birth. Finally, the new legislation should set forth a time period in
which the court must approve the contract in order to ensure that the
parties are not placed in limbo for an indeterminate period of time. 132
5. Residency Requirement
The proposed legislation should also include a residency require-
ment to avoid forum shopping and make certain that the Michigan
court system is able to regulate these contracts.'33 Utah requires that
126. Id. § 168-B:16(I)(a).
127. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20(a)(5), (b)(4).
128. See id. at 47/15(b).
129. KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 9, at 157.
130. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801 (LexisNexis 1953 & repl. vol. 2008).
131. Id. § 78B-15-802.
132. MODEL Acr GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 703 (Proposed Official Draft
2008).
133. Illinois has become a "magnet" for gestational surrogacy contracts because the GSA
does not contain a residency requirement. Richey, supra note 12, at 187. For an example of this
notion, in In re Adoption of Samant, a couple from New York used a surrogate from California
but wanted to adopt the child in Arkansas due to Arkansas's short residency requirement. 970
S.W.2d 249, 250 (Ark. 1998). California required a six-month residency requirement and New
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either the intended parents or the surrogate reside within the state for
ninety days before they may petition for court approval of the surro-
gacy agreement.134 A residency requirement would help ensure that
the parties stay in Michigan to carry out the pregnancy and give the
legislature a greater ability to regulate gestational surrogate
pregnancies.
6. Compensation
Compensation for surrogate pregnancy services has been the topic
of much heated debate, with Michigan going so far as to impose crimi-
nal penalties on those who engage in surrogacy contracts for compen-
sation.135 For the states that allow compensation in surrogacy
contracts, questions arise as to how to regulate compensation and how
to define what is considered reasonable compensation. 13 6 By allowing
compensation in surrogacy contracts, the Michigan legislation would
be able to set forth requirements-possibly strict requirements-and
give courts the power to regulate this compensation. If nothing else,
the legislature should repeal the criminal penalties for contracts pro-
viding compensation, as these penalties paint Michigan as the most
antisurrogacy state in the United States.137
7. Contract Disputes
Like any contract, it is inevitable that there will be disputes. The
Michigan legislature should require courts to follow the intent doc-
trine established in California case law to remedy these disputes.138
The judicially created intent doctrine looks to the original intent of
York does not enforce surrogacy contracts. Id. In order to establish residency in Arkansas, Mrs.
Samant lived in a hotel for thirty days. Id.
134. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-802(2).
135. Richey, supra note 12, at 184-85. "Intended parents in Michigan wanting to reproduce
via gestational surrogacy might face undesirable consequences if they try to form surrogacy con-
tracts under their own laws. For example, they could lose custody of their genetic offspring or
face criminal sanctions." Id. at 185. It should be noted that Illinois's favorable gestational surro-
gacy legislation makes Illinois an attractive option for Michigan couples looking to enter into
these contracts, especially due to the proximity of the states. Id.
136. Id. at 185-86. The language used by the GSA regarding compensation is broad and does
not provide much direction as to what constitutes "reasonable." Id The only list it provides of
acceptable expenses contains broad categories of medical, legal, and professional, and qualified
by the term "without limitation." Id. at 185. "The Illinois reasonableness standard is too gray
and uncertain. It will be interesting to see how courts address excessive compensation if the
issue arises in the future. Rather than have such a scenario arise, it would be better if the Gen-
eral Assembly set some clear boundaries." Id. at 186.
137. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 9, at 163. "Michigan has the harshest penalties for
entering into or facilitating a surrogacy contract." Arshagouni, supra note 14, at 806.
138. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
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the parties to determine parentage when genetics and biology cannot
provide a clear resolution.139 The obligations and ramifications of a
surrogacy contract are clear. The intent of the parties can be easily
discerned by the courts. 140
IV. IMPACT
If the Michigan legislature were to enact the proposed amendments
to the SPA, significant changes would occur with regard to surrogate
pregnancies and potential surrogacy contracts. By imposing require-
ments on the intended parents and the surrogate, surrogacy contracts
would be validated and a legal recourse for determining the parentage
of children born via surrogate would be established. 141 Upholding
surrogacy contracts through judicial approval would require involve-
ment from the courts to validate the contract and determine
parentage.
A. The Impact of a New Gestational Surrogacy Law on
Contracting Parties
1. Impact on Intended Parents
While there is currently no contractual protection in Michigan for
intended parents or surrogates, surrogate pregnancies are easier to be-
gin in Michigan than in states like Illinois, New Hampshire, and Utah
due to those states' implementation of specific requirements for both
intended parents and surrogates. 142 The creation of similar require-
ments in Michigan would potentially make the process of having a
child via surrogate much longer. Even so, the certainty of a judicial
order determining parentage of the child before birth provides protec-
tion to the intended parents that would greatly outweigh any potential
delay. 143
139. Id.
140. Some argue that following the intent doctrine in this context would lead courts to deter-
mine that the biological creators of an unplanned, but ultimately desired, child are not consid-
ered the legal parents. Schultz, supra note 81, at 283. However, advocates of the intent doctrine
contend that the intent of the parties is only used to determine parentage when there are con-
flicting claims by the parties involved. Id. Therefore, where there are not "intentional parents,"
the biology of the child is used to determine its legal parents. Id.
141. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-802 (LexisNexis 1953 & repl. vol. 2008); KINDREGAN &
McBRIEN, supra note 9, at 176.
142. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20 (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:13 (1955 & repl.
vol. 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801.
143. These types of statutory schemes protect the interests of the intended parents by allowing
for prebirth parentage determination. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/5 ("The purpose of this Act is to
establish consistent standards and procedural safeguards for the protection of all parties in-
9332012]
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The proposed legislation would also provide contractual protection
to individuals and couples who do not have a genetic relationship to
the child born via surrogacy. Even in those states that uphold such
contracts, these individuals have been unable to utilize a gestational
surrogacy contract. Illinois, New Hampshire, and Utah all require
that at least one of the intended parents have a genetic relationship to
the child: either the egg of the intended mother or sperm of the in-
tended father must be used in the IVF procedure.144 However, this
requirement categorically leaves out couples and individuals who, for
varying reasons, are unable to utilize the egg or sperm of the intended
parents. For example, a woman diagnosed with cancer during her
childhood or childbearing years may become infertile due to her can-
cer treatment's toxic effect on her reproductive organs. 145 "[M]any
people are able to live longer lives, yet feel that their lives are incom-
plete because they became infertile." 146 Couples may also decide to
utilize both an egg and sperm donor for fear that they themselves may
pass a genetic disorder to their child. A recessive genetic disorder
requires the presence of a disease gene from each of the parents, re-
sulting in a twenty-five percent chance that a child born to parents
carrying the gene will have the genetic disorder.147 Examples of reces-
sive genetic disorders include cystic fibrosis and Tay-Sachs disease.148
Parents who have been identified as carriers of a disease gene or who
have given birth to a child with a genetic disorder may wish to con-
ceive a child via surrogate utilizing both an egg and sperm donor in
order remove the risk of passing along the genetic disorder.
Under the frameworks of Illinois, New Hampshire, and Utah, peo-
ple in these reproductive situations are unable to create a valid gesta-
tional surrogacy contract. In contrast, the proposed legislation
volved in a gestational surrogacy contract in this State and to confirm the legal status of children
born as a result of these contracts.").
144. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20(b); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:17(III); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78B-15-801(5).
145. See Gregory Dolin et al., Medical Hope, Legal Pitfalls: Potential Legal Issues in the
Emerging Field of Oncofertility, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 673, 673-74 (2009) ("[Olver the last
forty years, survival rates for childhood cancer have risen from twenty percent to eighty-one
percent. However, the very success of new and improved therapies has created a host of
problems that were not previously considered. One of the results of the increased rate of post-
cancer survival is the commensurate desire of former cancer patients to return to healthy lives,
which for many includes having children." (footnote omitted)).
146. Id. at 674.
147. Frequently Asked Questions About Genetic Disorders, NAT'L Hum. GENOME RESEARCH
INST., http://www.genome.gov/pfv.cfm?pagelD=19016930 (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).
148. Id. "Cystic fibrosis (CF) is the most common, fatal genetic disease in the United States."
Learning About Cystic Fibrosis, NAT'L Hum. GENOME RESEARCH INST., http://www.genome.
gov/10001213 (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).
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provides contractual protection to both the woman with cancer and
the parents at risk for passing along a genetic disorder because it does
not require that the child have a genetic relationship to the intended
parents.
2. Impact on Surrogates
The proposed legislation sets forth requirements that surrogates
must meet in order to be a party to a judicially approved surrogacy
contract. The potential impact on surrogates is threefold. Surrogates
must be determined medically fit not only to conceive and carry the
child, but also to deal with the potential stress of giving the child to
the intended parents upon its birth. The medical evaluation impacts
surrogates because the requirements impose procedures and evalua-
tions that may be time consuming and intrusive. Some women may be
prevented from serving as a surrogate due to issues discovered during
these evaluations. Under the current SPA, there is no standard that a
woman is required to meet in order to serve as a surrogate.
The proposed changes to the SPA would also impact surrogates by
providing them with information about the intended parents before
the pregnancy even begins. Such information would include the
mental health status of the intended parents, which could be vital to a
woman's decision to act as a surrogate. Laschell Baker stated that if
she had been made aware of Amy Kehoe's mental illness she likely
would not have gone through with the pregnancy, and the ensuing
custody battle would not have occurred. 149
Finally, changes to the SPA would impact potential surrogates by
providing assurance through the judicially approved surrogacy con-
tract providing that the intended parents are legally responsible for
the child.' 50 A surrogacy contract would legally determine the parent-
age of the child prebirth, which would remove any legal responsibility
of the surrogate as the biological parent of the child. This contractual
protection has the potential to encourage some women to serve as a
surrogate because of the legal determination of parentage, but it may
also dissuade women who may be unsure about the idea of having no
legal connection to the child after its birth.151
149. Saul, supra note 2.
150. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47 (2010).
151. See Lorillard, supra note 21, at 250.
Proponents of surrogacy, however, point out that surrogacy contracts must be
deemed voluntary precisely because they are made prior to conception, and thus re-
quire the surrogate's voluntary and active participation in order to become pregnant.
Additionally, most surrogacy arrangements "proceed routinely to the conclusion de-
2012] 935
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
3. Impact on the Court System
Requiring judicial pre-approval of the surrogacy contract dictates
involvement from the court system. Due to the sensitive issues ad-
dressed by surrogacy contracts, courts experienced in family law and
child-placement issues are best suited to validate surrogacy contracts
and make the prebirth parentage determinations.
The proposed legislation's greatest impact on the court system is
likely the potential burden that requiring judicial approval of surro-
gacy contracts may impose on an already overloaded court system.
However, the relatively small number of pregnancies that occur via
surrogate each year may not impose such a burden as to outweigh the
benefits of regulating surrogate pregnancies and accompanying con-
tracts.152 New Hampshire's experience should be instructive, as the
legislature enacted a system of judicial approval that has remained
since the implementation of the statute.153
If the Michigan legislature determines that requiring judicial pre-
approval like New Hampshire imposes too great a burden on the
Michigan court system, there are other formats that do not require
judicial involvement.154 Illinois, for example, eliminates the need for
court supervision by requiring only a certification of the prebirth par-
entage request by the Department of Public Health.15 5 While requir-
ing judicial approval is the most comprehensive format to protect the
interests of all parties to a surrogacy contract, the Illinois framework
provides an alternative that may be utilized if judicial efficiency be-
comes a concern standing in the way of legislation validating surro-
gacy contracts.
V. CONCLUSION
Michigan's Surrogate Parenting Act is completely outdated by to-
day's technological standards. 156 An umbrella of federal regulation
would be ideal to regulate these interactions and contracts;157 how-
ever, immediate attention should be given to Michigan's SPA due to
its strict penalties and outright ban of gestational surrogacy contract.
sired by all parties at the outset-a woman who can bear children assisting a childless
couple to fulfill their desire for a biologically-related child."
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 704
S.W.2d 209, 214 (Ky. 1986)).
152. IVF Success Rate Reports, supra note 92.
153. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16(I) (1955 & repl. vol. 2002).
154. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/25.
155. Id. at 47/35.
156. KINDREGAN & McBRIEN, supra note 9, at 163.
157. See generally Arshagouni, supra note 14.
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The SPA provides no regulation or oversight of surrogate pregnancies
and provides judicial intervention when a dispute arises. Michigan
should amend the SPA. The new legislation should provide require-
ments that the intended parents, surrogate, and contract must meet in
order for a surrogacy contract to be validated. By introducing these
requirements, the legislature can create safeguards to ensure that the
interests of all parties to the contract are protected and that the result-
ing child is put in the safest environment possible upon its birth. If the
Kehoes and Laschell Baker had been afforded contract protection
when they decided to enter into a surrogacy arrangement, the result-
ing custody battle would not have occurred. The issues that arose af-
ter the birth of the twins would have been addressed before the
pregnancy even began. The current SPA is outdated and ineffective
because it does not prevent surrogate pregnancies from occurring, it
simply turns a blind eye to their existence. Michigan should amend
the Surrogate Parenting Act to uphold the validity of gestational sur-
rogacy contracts when all parties to the contract have met the require-
ments set forth by the new statute.
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